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ASTRACT:	   High	   policing	   has	   long	   been	   associated	   with	   the	   preservation	   and	  
augmentation	   of	   state	   interests	   by	   the	   intelligence	   community.	   However,	   this	  
paradigm	   can	   neither	   be	   examined,	   nor	   theorised,	   within	   an	   exclusively	   ‘public’	  
framework;	  a	  host	  of	  ‘private’	  actors	  must	  now	  be	  acknowledged	  on	  this	  conceptual	  
terrain.	  Moving	  beyond	  well-­‐acknowledged	  patterns	  of	  outsourcing	  intelligence,	  this	  
paper	   brings	   sharper	   research	   attention	   to	   transnational	   security	   consultancies	   as	  
well	  as	   the	  more	  shadowy	  realms	  of	  boutique	   intelligence	   firms,	  private	  detectives	  
and	  freelance	  covert	  operatives.	  By	  examining	  these	  new	  private	  categories	  of	  high	  
policing,	   this	  paper	  considers	   the	  complex	  patterns	  of	  convergence	  and	  divergence	  
that	   characterise	   the	   public-­‐private	   interface.	   Specific	   attention	   is	   devoted	   to	  
resources	  of	  symbolic	  power	  and	  how	  these	  impact	  the	  capacity	  for	  coercive	  action.	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Introduction	  
Across	   the	   various	   strata	   of	   policing	   and	   security	   activities,	   previously	   discernible	  
boundaries	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  have	  become	  indistinct	  and	  the	  
contemporary	  context	  of	  policing	  is	  at	  once	  both	  pluralised	  and	  interconnected	  (see,	  
for	   example:	   Berndtsson	   &	   Stern	   2011;	   Jones	   &	   Newburn	   2006;	  Marx	   1987).	   The	  
realm	  of	   ‘high	  policing’	   (Brodeur	  1983)	  –long	  associated	  with	   the	  preservation	  and	  
augmentation	   of	   state	   interests	   by	   intelligence	   agencies–	   is	   no	   exception.	   Recent	  
years	  have	  witnessed	  progressive	  acceptance	  of	  the	  proposal	  that	  this	  paradigm	  can	  
neither	  be	  examined,	  nor	  theorised,	  within	  an	  exclusively	  public	  framework	  (O’Reilly	  
&	  Ellison	  2006).	  The	  activities	  of	  a	  host	  of	  ‘private’	  actors	  must	  now	  be	  incorporated	  
alongside	  those	  of	  state	  security	   institutions,	  albeit	  that	  the	  latter	  generally	  remain	  
the	  dominant	  force.	  Consideration	  of	  these	  latecomers	  to	  the	  conceptual	  terrain	  of	  
high	   policing	   also	   entails	   much	   more	   than	   the	   burgeoning	   trend	   in	   outsourcing	  
intelligence	   functions	  –particularly	  prevalent	   in	   the	  US–	  and	  necessitates	  a	   sharper	  
focus	   on	   a	   range	   of	   actors	   that	   spans	   transnational	   security	   consultancies	   to	   the	  
more	  shadowy	  realm	  of	  boutique	  intelligence	  firms,	  private	  detectives	  and	  freelance	  
covert	   operatives.	   Furthermore,	   as	   national	   economic	   interests	   are	   weaved	   into	  
national	   security	   objectives,	   ‘espionage	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   state	   may	   blur	   into	  
espionage	   on	   behalf	   of	   corporations’	   (Sheptycki	   2000:	   12-­‐13;	   see	   also,	   Petersen	  
2014);	  some	  corporations	  even	  functioning	  as	  de	  facto	  extensions	  of	  the	  intelligence	  
apparatus	  (see	  Weiss,	  forthcoming,	  on	  telecommunications	  companies).	  Across	  this	  
expanding	  spectrum	  of	  high	  policing	  activity,	  the	  relationship	  between	  its	  public	  and	  
private	  manifestations	  has	  emerged	  as	  multi-­‐faceted	  and	  overwhelmingly	  opaque.	  
By	   charting	   the	   diverse	   roles	   of	   those	   actors	   engaged	   in	   private	   high	   policing,	   this	  
paper	   explores	   patterns	   of	   convergence	   and	   divergence	   in	   the	   contemporary	   high	  
policing	   field.	   To	   achieve	   this,	   it	   proposes	   a	  more	   complex	   array	   of	   ‘auspices’	   and	  
‘providers’	   (Bayley	   &	   Shearing	   2001)	   than	   has	   traditionally	   been	   acknowledged.	  
Adopting	  a	  less	  state-­‐centric	  research	  approach,	  it	  expands	  upon	  a	  number	  of	  works	  
that	   have	   considered	   related	   developments	   in	   the	   ‘pluralization	   of	   intelligence	  
networks’	  (Lippert	  &	  O’Connor	  2003),	  ‘security	  networks’	  (Gill	  2006),	  the	  intersection	  
of	   knowledge-­‐work	   and	   networks	   in	   policing	   (Brodeur	  &	  Dupont	   2006),	   as	  well	   as	  
‘grey	   intelligence’	   (Hoogenboom	   2006).	   However,	   this	   discussion	   is	   specifically	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rooted	  within	  the	  analytical	  frame	  and	  operational	  context	  of	  high	  policing.	  As	  Jean-­‐
Paul	   Brodeur	   –the	   progenitor	   of	   high	   policing	   theory–	   identified,	   there	   are	  
unresolved	   issues	   regarding	   its	   private	   dimensions;	   not	   least	   the	   need	   to	   examine	  
how	   inter-­‐related	   notions	   of	   symbolic	   power,	   legitimacy	   and	   the	   capacity	   for	  
coercive	   and	  extra-­‐legal	   activity	   vary	   across	   the	  public	   and	  private	  domains	   (2007:	  
34).	  
By	   focusing	   upon	   pluralisation,	   this	   paper	   addresses	   these	   deficiencies	   whilst	   also	  
developing	   a	  more	   nuanced	   theoretical	   platform	   for	   future	   high	   policing	   research.	  
This	  is	  significant,	  as	  the	  skewed	  nature	  of	  previous	  academic	  studies	  towards	  public	  
forms	  has	  eclipsed	  a	  wide-­‐range	  of	  dubious	  activity	  in	  the	  private	  sphere.	  Of	  course,	  
inherent	   low-­‐visibility	  has	   assisted	   this	   evasion	  of	   critical	   attention,	   but	   so	   too	  has	  
conceptual	   and	   empirical	   neglect.	   The	   first	   step	   in	   tackling	   these	   lacunae	   is,	  
therefore,	   to	   identify	   and	   address	   frailties	   that	   inhibit	   existing	   theoretical	  
frameworks	  and	  research	  agendas.	  With	  these	  ambitions	  in	  mind,	  this	  paper	  aims	  to	  
do	   the	   following:	   to	   spotlight	   archetypal	   private	   high	   policing	   providers	   and	   draw	  
attention	   to	   their	   most	   disconcerting	   activities;	   to	   articulate	   the	   theoretical	  
implications	   of	   these	   private	   manifestations	   and	   propose	   necessary	   conceptual	  
refinement;	  to	  evaluate	  key	  areas	  of	  public/private	  distinction	  as	  well	  as	  to	  consider	  
blurred	   boundaries	   where	   operational	   overlaps	   and	   strategic	   coalescences	   occur;	  
and	  also,	   to	  provide	  a	   roadmap	   for	   future	   research	  ambitions	   in	  what	   is	  an	  under-­‐
recognised,	  and	  highly	  challenging,	  field.	  
The	  discussion	  is	  in	  divided	  into	  three	  parts.	  In	  Part	  One,	  the	  conceptual	  evolution	  of	  
high	   policing	   is	   retraced	   and	   its	   contemporary	   relevance	   reaffirmed.	   Part	   Two	  
progresses	  analysis	   towards	   the	  pluralisation	  of	  high	  policing,	  proposing	  a	   typology	  
of	   private	   actors	   and	  mapping	   their	   interaction	  with	   the	  public	   sphere.	   Part	   Three	  
seeks	   to	   identify	   points	   of	   connectivity	   and	   contrast.	   In	   particular	   it	   examines	   the	  
symbolic	   power	   of	   high	   policing	   and	   tests	   the	   assumption	   that	   public	   actors	   have	  
greater	  resources	  in	  this	  regard.	  
	  
High	  Policing	  
The	  influential	  high	  policing	  hypothesis	  was	  introduced	  to	  policing	  studies	  by	  the	  late	  
French-­‐Canadian	   criminologist	   Jean-­‐Paul	   Brodeur	   (1983).	   In	   a	   study	   that	   emerged	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against	   a	  backdrop	  of	   social	  upheaval	   and	   suppression	  of	  political	  dissent	   in	  North	  
America,	   he	   proposed	   a	   new	   conceptualisation	   of	   political	   policing	   that	   explicated	  
state	  security	  recourse	  to	  tactics	  of	  questionable	  legality.	  For	  him,	  the	  deployment	  of	  
dubious	  operational	  strategies,	  such	  as	  illegal	  wire-­‐tapping	  and	  agents	  provocateurs,	  
was	   not	   merely	   aberrational	   to	   normal	   police	   practice	   but	   actually	   constituted	  
systemic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  alternative	  paradigm	  of	  high	  policing	  (Brodeur	  1983:	  
508).	  Through	   the	   identification	  of	  both	   ideologogical	  and	  operational	   continuities,	  
Brodeur	  traced	  this	  paradigm’s	  origins	  back	  to	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  system	  of	  haute	  
police	   that	   was	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   absolutist	   rule	   in	   seventeenth	   and	   eighteenth	  
century	  France.	  Equally	   significant	  within	  his	  analysis	  was	   the	  necessity	   to	  create	  a	  
distinction	   between	   high	   policing	   and	   low	   policing:	   the	   former	   concentrates	   upon	  
the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  the	  state	  and	  dominant	  political	  actors;	  the	  latter	  is	  
concerned	  with	  the	  maintenance	  of	  order	  and	  the	  general	  suppression	  of	  crime.	  
From	   the	   intelligence	   communities	   of	   contemporary	   liberal	   democracies	   to	   the	  
secret	  police	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  from	  the	  social	  control	  of	  colonial	  policing	  to	  
the	  regime	  policing	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  settings,	  high	  policing	  has	  provided	  a	  theoretical	  
lense	   through	   which	   to	   analyse	   a	   range	   of	   questionable	   policing	   and	   intelligence	  
action.	  However,	  as	  following	  sections	  set	  out,	  the	  utility	  of	  this	  paradigm	  progresses	  
beyond	  those	  preserving	  and	  augmenting	  executive	  power	  and	  can	  be	  extended	  into	  
the	  private	  sphere.	  
In	   Brodeur’s	   last	   statement	   on	   high	   policing	   he	   set-­‐out	   nine	   key	   characteristics:	  
protection	  of	   the	  political	   regime;	   the	  state	  as	   intended	  victim;	  absorbent	  policing;	  
the	   utilization	   of	   criminals;	   the	   use	   of	   informants;	   secrecy;	   deceit;	   conflation	   of	  
separate	  powers;	  and,	  extra-­‐legality	  (2010:	  226-­‐234).	  For	  him,	  it	  was	  necessary	  that	  
several	   of	   these	   features	   be	   present	   for	   activities	   to	   fall	  within	   this	   paradigm	  –for	  
example,	  knowledge-­‐work	  alone	  could	  not	  qualify	  as	  high	  policing	   (2007:	  28;	  2010:	  
224).	  However,	  in	  seeking	  to	  maintain	  conceptual	  integrity,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  avoid	  treating	  
these	   characteristics	   proscriptively.	   Indeed,	   if	   we	   are	   to	   understand	   why	   high	  
policing	  has	  proved	  an	  enduring	  concept,	  with	  explanatory	  potential	  across	  diverse	  
contexts	  –not	  least	  across	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors–	  its	  flexibility	  and	  capacity	  
for	  recalibration	  must	  be	  recognised	  as	  key.	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Conceptual	  Fluidity	  
In	  a	   recent	  analysis	  of	  high	  policing,	  Marx	   (2014)	  discussed	  how	   it	  extends	  beyond	  
national	  security	  ‘to	  many	  social	  control	  settings	  in	  which	  organizations	  protect	  their	  
flanks,	   try	   to	   anticipate	   or	   orchestrate	   events	   and	   attend	   to	   actions,	   persons	   and	  
contexts	   seen	   as	   threats’.	   He	   further	   asserts	   that	   high	   policing	   can	   be	   recognised	  
through	  its	   location	  (proximity	  to	  power),	  its	  ethos	  (pervasive	  intelligence-­‐gathering	  
on	   threats	   to	   the	  status	  quo)	  and	   its	  methods	   (a	   range	  of	  questionable	   strategies).	  
Echoing	  this	  conceptual	  dissection,	  I	  would	  assert	  that	  high	  policing	  consists	  of	  a	  fluid	  
mix	  of	  constant	  and	  variable	  factors.	   Its	  essence	  is	   located	  in	  a	  constant	  ideological	  
orientation	   that	   ‘reaches	   out	   for	   potential	   threats	   in	   a	   systematic	   attempt	   to	  
preserve	   the	   distribution	   of	   power‘	   (Brodeur	   183:	   513).	   It	   is	   the	   variable	   means	  
through	   which	   this	   rationale	   is	   operationalized	   that	   both	   respond	   to	   context	   and	  
oscillate	  over	  time,	  albeit	  that	  they	  habitually	  share	  a	  dubious	  nature.	  For	  example,	  
the	   conceptualisation	  of	   contemporary	   high	   policing	  would	   be	   incomplete	  without	  
incorporating	  the	  impact	  of	  technological	  innovations	  upon	  surveillance,	  epitomised	  
by	   recourse	   to	  signals	   intelligence	   (Brodeur	  &	  Leman-­‐Langlois	  2006;	  Brodeur	  2010:	  
249).	  Furthermore,	  the	  techno-­‐oriented	  operations	  of	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  American	  
NSA	  and	  the	  British	  GCHQ	  draw	  upon	  a	  quite	  different	  high	  policing	  toolkit	  than	  their	  
partner	   agencies.	   Their	   operations	   also	   reiterate	   how	  pluralisation	   of	   high	   policing	  
does	  not	  solely	  refer	  to	  its	  increased	  manifestation	  in	  the	  private	  sphere	  but	  also	  to	  
diversification	  within	  the	  national	  intelligence	  assemblage	  itself.	  
These	   observations	   underscore	   the	   importance	   of	   looking	   beyond	   the	   traditional	  
operational	  remit	  of	  state	  security	  actors	  towards	  broader	  re-­‐imagination	  of	  not	  only	  
the	   intelligence	   community	   but	   also	   of	   the	   wider	   high	   policing	   context.	   Indeed,	  
progressing	  from	  the	  conceptual	  standpoint	  of	  a	  constant	  ideological	  rationale	  but	  a	  
variable	  operational	  deployment	   is	   fundamental.	   It	   reiterates	   the	  adaptable	  nature	  
of	  high	  policing	  techniques	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  power	  arrangements	  they	  
protect	  extend	  far	  beyond	  the	  executive	  or	  narrow	  ruling	  elites.	  As	  Manning	  (2006)	  
has	  astutely	  observed:	  
‘It	   is	   in	   theory,	   lurking	   and	   invisible,	   often	   illegal,	   whilst	   claiming	   to	   produce	  
reassurance.	   High	   policing	   is	   flexible,	   semi-­‐visible	   and	   thus	   rediscovered	   and	  
reconfigured	  as	  befits	  the	  times.’	  (2006:	  60;	  emphasis	  added)	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Although	   this	   comment	   was	   directed	   at	   state	   security	   responses	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
counter-­‐terrorism,	  it	  provides	  an	  equally	  adept	  reflection	  on	  those	  activities	  that	  can	  
be	   classified	   as	  private	  high	  policing.	   In	   fact,	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  private	   forms	  of	  
high	   policing	   flexibly	   respond	   to	   both	   market	   threats	   and	   market	   opportunities	  
indicates	  a	  potentially	  greater	  capacity	  for	  reinvention	  and	  recalibration.	  
	  
‘High	  Times’	  for	  High	  Policing	  
Whilst	  Brodeur	  had	  previously	  heralded	  the	  ‘coming	  of	  age’	  of	  high	  policing	  –both	  in	  
North	  America	   (1983:	  645)	  and	  transnationally	   (2000:	  43)–	   it	  was	   the	  controversial	  
counter-­‐terrorism	   strategies	   deployed	   post-­‐9/11	   that	   saw	   his	   intuitions	   confirmed	  
(2007:	  20).	  However,	  one	  need	  not	  look	  to	  the	  excess	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  War	  on	  Terror	  
to	  assert	  the	  continued	  relevance	  of	  high	  policing	  theory.1	  At	  the	  time	  of	  composing	  
this	  work,	   controversies	  abound	   regarding	  covert	  operations	   falling	  under	   the	  high	  
policing	  mantle,	  both	  globally	  and	  domestically.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2013,	  NSA	  whistle-­‐
blower,	   Edward	   Snowden,	   revealed	   how	   US	   intelligence	   had	   been	   conducting	  
extensive	   data-­‐mining	   programmes	   and	   surveillance	   initiatives	   that	   extended	   far	  
beyond	  suspected	  parameters	  (Greenwald	  &	  MacAskill	  2013).	  In	  the	  domestic	  British	  
context	   of	   combatting	   subversion,	   extensive	   infiltration	   of	   protest	   groups	   has	   also	  
been	  uncovered	  with	  attention	  focusing	  on	  special	  units	  of	  the	  London	  Metropolitan	  
Police’s	  Special	  Branch.	  Revelations	  regarding	  these	  clandestine	  units	  include	  sordid	  
discoveries	   that	   police	   infiltrators	   adopted	   dead	   children’s	   identities	   to	   build	   their	  
cover	   (Creedon	   2013)	   and	   that	   some	   agents	   even	   developed	   long-­‐term	   sexual	  
relationships	  with	  individuals	  they	  were	  spying	  on	  (Lewis	  &	  Evans	  2013).	  
In	   terms	   of	   high	   policing	   pluralisation,	   it	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   both	   cases	   possess	  
significant	  private	  dimensions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  NSA	  surveillance,	  Edward	  Snowden	  had	  
left	  the	  public	  sector	  to	  work	  for	  private	  intelligence	  contractor	  Booz	  Allen	  Hamilton	  
                                                
1 Whilst	   the	  systematic	   reshaping	  of	   routine	   (low)	  policing	   to	   reflect	  high	  policing	  agendas	  –as	  with	  
contemporary	   counter-­‐terrorism–	   could	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   marker	   for	   diminishing	   relevance	   of	  
Brodeur’s	  bipartite	  distinction,	   I	  would	  contest	   that	  such	  patterns	  are	  more	  accurately	  portrayed	  as	  
symbolising	  high	  policing	  ascendance.	  Indeed,	  if	  low	  policing	  reflects,	  and	  indeed	  fulfils,	  the	  objectives	  
of	   high	   policing	   agencies,	   then	   this	   only	   serves	   to	   underscore	   the	   latter’s	   dominance.	   Through	  
characteristic	   ‘net-­‐widening’,	   it	  has	  successfully	  colonised	  other	  members	  of	   the	  policing	   family	  and	  
steered	  them	  towards	  its	  own	  priorities	  (for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  evaluation	  of	  the	  contemporary	  relevance	  of	  
Brodeur’s	  conceptual	  distinction,	  see:	  O’Reilly	  &	  Ellison	  2006:	  645-­‐646).	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in	  the	  period	  running	  up	  to	  his	  disclosure	  of	  these	  secrets;	  there	  are	  also	  indications	  
of	   collaboration	  between	   leading	  US	   corporations	   and	   the	  NSA.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  
covert	   Special	   Branch	   operations,	   private	   detectives	   simultaneously	   infiltrated	   at	  
least	  one	  of	  the	  targeted	  groups,	  London	  Greenpeace.	  McDonalds	  had	  hired	  them	  to	  
infiltrate	  the	  group	  following	  protests	  against	  the	  fast-­‐food	  chain.	  Whilst	  the	  extent	  
and	  nature	  of	  likely	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  undercover	  police	  officers	  and	  infiltrated	  
private	   detectives	   remains,	   all	   too	   characteristically,	   opaque,	   both	   groups	   of	  
infiltrators	   acted	   as	   agents	   provocateurs,	   displaying	   a	   ‘commitment	   to	   wide	  
dissemination	  of	  allegedly	  libellous	  material’	  (Gill	  &	  Hart	  1999:	  258).	  
These	   cases	   not	   only	   reiterate	   that	   covert	   high	   policing	   activities	   are	   a	   constant	  
societal	  feature	  –even	  in	  supposed	  democracies–	  but	  also	  that	  there	  are	   important	  
private	   dynamics	  which	  must	   be	   incorporated	   into	   both	  our	   theories	   and	   analysis.	  
The	  past	  decade	  has	  certainly	  witnessed	  high	  policing	  resurgence	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  
its	  private	  manifestations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  public-­‐private	  intersection	  remain	  
under-­‐theorised	   and	   under-­‐examined.	   The	   following	   discussion	   initiates	   progress	  
towards	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  these	  relational	  dynamics,	  charting	  processes	  of	  
pluralisation	  and	  setting	  out	  key	  ‘private’	  players	  in	  the	  high	  policing	  realm.	  
	  
The	  Pluralisation	  of	  High	  Policing	  
In	  1996,	  Bayley	   and	  Shearing	  heralded	  a	  paradigm	   shift	   in	   the	  delivery	  of	  policing,	  
remarking	   that:	   ‘Policing	   has	   become	   pluralized.	   Police…have	   been	   supplanted	   by	  
more	  numerous	  private	  providers	  of	  security’	  (1996:	  588).	  Whilst	  their	  analysis	  was	  
firmly	  rooted	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  low	  policing,	  similar	  trends	  are	  now	  acknowledged	  
within	  its	  high	  policing	  counterpart.	  Whilst	  the	  superiority	  of	  its	  public	  forms	  has	  not	  
been	  undermined	   to	   the	  same	  degree,	   this	  paradigm	  can	  no	   longer	  be	  held	  out	  as	  
the	  exclusive	  domain	  of	  state	  security	  actors.	  As	  embodied	  in	  the	  re-­‐conceptualised	  
proposal	  of	  ‘private	  high	  policing’	  (O’Reilly	  &	  Ellison	  2006),	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  need	  to	  
detach	   original	   theory	   from	   its	   umbilical	   linkage	   to	   the	   state.	   However,	   despite	  
recognition	   of	   this	   theoretical	   advance,	   subsequent	   commentary	   regarding	   high	  
policing’s	   private	   dynamics	   has	   proved	   speculative	   (Brodeur	   2007:	   31;	   2010:	   288-­‐
293)	   and	   provisional	   (Ocqueteau	   2012).	   Notably,	   there	   has	   been	   no	   concerted	  
attempt	  to	   identify	  or	   to	  map	  those	  providers	  who	  engage	   in	  private	  high	  policing.	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Consideration	  of	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  methods	  that	  have	  evolved	  
to	   protect	   and	   augment	   corporate	   interests	   and	   those	   deployed	   to	   maintain	  
dominant	  political	  arrangements	  has	  also	  been	  limited.	  Certainly,	  shared	  overarching	  
ambitions	  to	  preserve	  respective	  status	  quos	  of	  power	  distribution	  has	  engendered	  a	  
degree	  of	   symbiosis	  and	  strategically	  orchestrated	   interaction;	  as	  have	   increasingly	  
bilateral	  flows	  of	  personnel,	  intelligence	  and	  techniques	  (O’Reilly	  2010).	  However,	  it	  
must	   still	   be	   emphasized	   that	   nuanced	   differences	   will	   often	   characterise	   their	  
respective	  use	  of	  dubious	  methods.	  Quite	  simply,	  those	  who	  operate	  in	  the	  private	  
sphere	   often	   confront	   different	   challenges	   and	   opportunities	   when	   pursuing	   their	  
high	  policing	   remit.	   There	  may	   also	  be	   consequent	   variations	   in	   the	  ways	   that	   the	  
more	  pernicious	  effects	  of	  private	  high	  policing	  become	  manifest.	  
Somewhat	  inevitably,	  the	  analytical	  framework	  adopted	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  constructed	  
around	  the	  public/private	  dichotomy.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  bifurcation	  and	  is	  
principally	  deployed	  for	  heuristic	  reasons:	  to	  reiterate	  that	  high	  policing	  is	  not	  solely	  
concerned	  with	  the	  public	  sphere;	  and	  also,	  to	  assist	  comprehension	  of	  its	  relational	  
dynamics.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  given	  that	  strategic	  exploitation	  of	  interstitial	  
areas	  has	  been	  an	   increasing	   trend	  within	  high	  policing	   (see,	   for	  example:	   Lubbers	  
2012;	   Marx	   1987;	   O’Reilly	   &	   Ellison	   2006;	   O’Reilly	   2010).	   The	   typology	   of	   private	  
actors	  that	  is	  presented	  must	  therefore	  be	  located	  within	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  duplicity	  
and	   complicity	   that	   is	   characterised	   by	  multidimensional	   interaction.	   This	   ensures	  
that	   the	   analysis	   of	   private	   high	   policing	   extends	   beyond	   a	   limited	   focus	   on	  
privatization;	  essentially	  a	  theoretical	  residue	  from	  traditional	  prioritisation	  of	  state	  
security	   agency	   which	   has	   witnessed	   privileged	   attention	   to	   outsourcing	   (see,	   for	  
example:	   Brodeur	   &	   Leman-­‐Langlois	   2006:	   179;	   Brodeur	   2007:	   31).	   As	   indicated	  
above	  such	  emphasis	  masks	  how	  private	  high	  policing	  entails	  much	  more	   than	   the	  
delegation	   of	   state	   security	   functions	   and	   encompasses	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   actors,	  
who	  may	  serve	  both	  public	  and	  private	  clients	  alike.	  	  
This	  intertwining	  of	  public	  and	  private	  high	  policing	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  ‘providers’,	  but	  
also	  includes	  their	  authorising	  ‘auspices’	  (Bayley	  &	  Shearing	  2001).	  For	  example,	  the	  
national	  security	  interest	  now	  openly	  extends	  to	  protecting	  and	  enhancing	  the	  global	  
competitiveness	  of	   key	  national	   industries;	  what	  has	  been	   termed	   ‘economic	  well-­‐
being’	  in	  Britain	  (Gill	  2003:	  275)	  or	  ‘Secteurs	  d’Activité	  d’Importance	  Vitale’	  (‘Sectors	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of	   Activities	   of	   Vital	   Importance’)	   in	   France	   (Ocqueteau	   2011:	   17;	   2012:	   16).	   Such	  
intersection	   of	   state	   security	   and	   powerful	   corporate	   interests	   has	   stimulated	  
developments	   pertinent	   to	   the	   pluralisation	   of	   high	   policing	   that	   include:	   the	  
appointment	   of	   former	   state	   security	   officials	   to	   board-­‐level	   and	   senior	   security	  
positions	   within	   key	   industrial	   sectors	   (Ocqueteau	   2011);	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	  
strategic	   partnerships	   to	   facilitate	   intelligence	   sharing	   and	   fusion	   toward	   mutual	  
security	   objectives	   (O’Reilly	   2010);	   and,	   the	   pursuit	   of	   economic	   espionage	   and	  
industrial	   spying	   to	   achieve	   strategic	   advantage	   over	   competitors,	   as	   well	   as	   legal	  
and	  technological	  counter-­‐actions	  (Nasheri	  2005).	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This	  diagram	  conveys	  the	  pluralised	  nature	  of	  the	  high	  policing	  field,	  identifying	  key	  
private	   providers	   and	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	   diversity	  within	   this	   paradigm.	   The	  
variable	  operational	  methods	  that	  characterise	  high	  policing	  are	  amalgamated	  into	  a	  
spectrum	   that	   spans	   ‘knowledge	  work’	   to	   ‘covert	   action’.	   These	   two	   elements	   are	  
singled	   out	   as	   end-­‐points	   not	   because	   they	   represent	   opposing	   characteristics	   –
which	   they	   do	   not,	   intelligence	   is	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   covert	   action–	   but	   rather	  
because	   in	   their	  purest	   forms	   they	  can	  be	   imagined	  as	   capturing	  more	  benign/licit	  
and	  more	  malignant/illicit	   indicators	   of	   high	   policing.	   This	   spectrum	   is	   further	   set	  
against	  a	  public-­‐private	  continuum	  to	  transmit	  the	  respective	  auspices	  and	  providers	  
involved.	  In	  this	  way,	  analysis	  progresses	  beyond	  a	  strict	  dichotomy	  towards	  greater	  
relational	   complexity;	   i.e.	   significant	  areas	  of	  confluence	  where	  public	   reaches	   into	  
private	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  The	  over-­‐arching	  spread	  of	  auspices	  also	  reflects	  how	  private	  
providers	  often	  serve	  both	  public	  and	  private	  clients.	  Albeit	   that	  should	   they	  enter	  
the	   realm	  of	   public	   service,	   their	   actions	  will	  most	   likely	   be	   directed	   by	   the	   policy	  
objectives	   of	   one	   dominant	   state,	   whereas	   they	   might	   have	   multiple	   concurrent	  
private	  clients	  (Brodeur	  2010:	  289).	  It	  is	  also	  important	  that	  these	  providers	  are	  not	  
viewed	  as	  statically	  locked	  but	  rather	  as	  in	  constant	  oscillation.	  Their	  protean	  nature	  
is	   a	   consequence	  of	   both	   inherent	   responsiveness	   to	  new	  market	  opportunities	   as	  
well	  as	  a	   reflection	  of	  how	  various	  societal	   catalysts	   shape	   their	  operational	   remit.	  
Furthermore,	  those	  providers	  depicted	  in	  this	  typology	  are	  archetypes	  and	  represent	  
the	  most	  identifiable	  private	  configurations	  of	  high	  policing	  characteristics.	  There	  are	  
inevitably	  areas	  of	  operational	  overlap,	  whether	  as	  a	  result	  of	  shared	  market	  space	  
or	  more	  calculated	  collaborations;	  more	  illicit	  pursuits	  are	  sometimes	  subcontracted	  
to	  other,	  less	  visible,	  private	  high	  policing	  providers.	  
In	   placing	   these	   caveats	   around	   a	   diagram	   that	   is	   indicative	   rather	   than	   rigidly	  
comprehensive,	  one	  final	  point	  must	  be	  emphasized:	  its	  primary	  objective	  is	  to	  shed	  
light	  on	  the	  range	  of	  providers	  engaged	  in	  private	  high	  policing	  only.	  Although	  public	  
high	  policing	  is	  represented	  through	  holistic	  inclusion	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community,	  
no	  attempt	  has	  been	  made	   to	  disaggregate	   this	   assemblage	   into	   specific	   agencies.	  
Certainly,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   develop	   a	   comparable	   typology	   of	   the	   institutional	  
framework	  for	  state	  security	  but	  that	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  discussion.	  For	  now,	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our	   analytic	   focus	   is	   upon	   those	   actors	   who	   can	   be	   categorised	   as	   private	   high	  
policing	  providers.	  
	  
Private	  Intelligence	  Contractors	  
Amongst	  the	  various	  contemporary	  manifestations	  of	  private	  high	  policing,	   it	   is	  the	  
trend	  towards	  outsourcing	  intelligence	  functions	  in	  the	  United	  States	  that	  has	  drawn	  
most	  critical	  attention	  due	  to	  the	  scale	  and	  nature	  of	  delegated	  activities	  (Brodeur	  &	  
Leman-­‐Langlois	  2006:	  Chesterman	  2011;	   Shorrock	  2008).	   It	   is	   estimated	   that	   some	  
70%	   of	   the	   $52	   billion	   U.S.	   intelligence	   budget	   is	   currently	   spent	   on	   contractors	  
(Chatterjee	   2013).	   Unsurprisingly,	   the	   boardrooms	   of	   leading	   private	   intelligence	  
contractors	   such	   as	   Lockheed	   Martin	   and	   Northrup	   Grumman	   are	   replete	   with	  
distinguished	   retirees	   from	   state	   security	   service.2	   Indeed,	   current	   public-­‐private	  
interaction	  has	  become	  so	  intense	  and	  complex	  that	  simplistic	  notions	  of	  migration	  
from	  public	  service	  to	  private	  employ	  are	  now	  antiquated.	  One	  report	  heralding	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  ‘National	  Security	  Industrial	  Complex’	  describes	  how	  individuals	  ‘slip	  
from	   one	   role	   in	   industry	   to	   another	   in	   government,	   cross-­‐promoting…and	   self-­‐
dealing	   in	  ways	   that	  make	   the	   fabled	   revolving	   door	   redundant,	   if	   not	   completely	  
disorienting’	  (Chatterjee	  2013).	  
As	  recent	  whistle-­‐blower	  revelations	  reiterate,	  contractors	  –with	  top-­‐secret	  security	  
clearances–	   have	   not	   only	   participated	   in	   surveillance	   systems	   to	   track	   terrorists	  
abroad	  but	  have	  also	  been	  deployed	  within	  sophisticated	  data-­‐mining	  programmes	  
inside	   the	   US	   homeland	   (Chatterjee	   2010;	   Shorrock	   2008).	   Such	   pervasive	  
intelligence-­‐gathering	  mechanisms	  invoke	  key	  signatures	  of	  high	  policing.	  However,	  
there	   are	   other	   instances	   of	   private	   participation	   at	   the	  more	   coercive	   and	   extra-­‐
legal	   end	   of	   the	   high	   policing	   spectrum	   that	   have	   related	   to	   some	   of	   the	   most	  
controversial	   tactics	   associated	   with	   the	   War	   on	   Terror;	   notably	   coercive	  
interrogation	   of	   detainees	   and	   rendition	   (Chesterman	   2011;	   Jamieson	   &	   McEvoy	  
2005).	  	  
Whilst	   it	   is	   important	   to	  emphasize	   that	   the	   trend	   towards	  privatised	  high	  policing	  
has	  not	  yet	  been	  evident	  to	  a	  comparable	  extent	  outside	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  case	  
                                                
2	   For	   a	   useful	   summary	   of	   key	   intelligence	   contractors,	   see	   the	   database	   available	   at:	  
www.crocodyl.org/spiesforhire	  (Accessed	  August	  19,	  2013).	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still	  contradicts	  one	  previous	  hypothesis	  regarding	  private	  high	  policing,	  namely	  that:	  
‘the	   higher	   the	   stakes	   in	   security	   the	   more	   will	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   public	  
government	   be	   (re)asserted’	   (Brodeur	   2007:	   32).	   Indeed,	   even	   if	   private	   firms	   are	  
less	  likely	  to	  be	  active	  in	  traditional	  areas	  of	  state	  espionage	  such	  as	  running	  covert	  
agents,	  work	  that	  they	  have	  performed	  includes	  devising	  false	  identities	  for	  overseas	  
case-­‐officers	  (Miller	  2006)	  as	  well	  as	  recruitment	  and	  handling	  of	  human	  intelligence	  
sources	   in	   Iraq	   (Chesterman	   2011:	   114).	   What	   is	   clear	   amongst	   these	   various	  
anecdotes	   is	   that	   the	   appetite	   for	   delegating	   intelligence	   functions	   has	   proved	  
insatiable	  and	  exists	  within	  a	  permissive	  neoliberal	  environment.	  Moreover,	  it	  seems	  
that	  when	  private	  providers	  reach	  towards	  the	  more	  coercive,	  extra-­‐legal	  end	  of	  the	  
high	  policing	  spectrum,	  they	  invariably	  act	  under	  state	  auspices.	  
	  
Transnational	  Security	  Consultancies	  
Transnational	   security	   consultancies	   (‘TSCs’)	   represent	   a	   more	   measured	   form	   of	  
high	  policing.	  Firms	  such	  as	  Control	  Risks,	  Diligence	  and	  The	  Risk	  Advisory	  Group	  are	  
characterized	  by	  their	  extensive	  global	  footprints	  and	  their	  provision	  of	  sophisticated	  
security	  solutions	  that	  reduce	  client	  risk-­‐exposure	  in	  hostile	  environments.	  The	  fact	  
that	   many	   TSC	   service-­‐lines	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   ‘knowledge-­‐work’	   has	   raised	  
doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  they	  fall	  within	  the	  high	  policing	  paradigm	  (Brodeur	  2007:	  33;	  
2010:	   224).	   Certainly,	   as	   commercial	   enterprises,	   TSCs	   attach	   great	   importance	   to	  
their	  established	  reputations	  and	  have	  traditionally	  steered	  clear	  of	  the	  sharper-­‐end	  
of	   security	   operations.	   Practice-­‐areas	   such	   as	   business	   intelligence,	   confidential	  
investigations,	   fraud	   prevention,	   political	   and	   security	   risk	   analysis	   and	   travel	  
security	  appear	  comparatively	  benign	  when	  set	  against	  more	  extreme	  forms	  of	  high	  
policing.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  naïve	  to	  dismiss	  TSCs	  as	  little	  more	  than	  high	  policing-­‐
lite.	   These	   firms’	   operating	   logic	   speaks	  directly	   to	   the	   ideological	   rationale	  of	   this	  
paradigm:	  they	  are	  defined	  by	  a	  proclivity	  to	  reach	  out	  for	  new	  threats	  –principally	  in	  
the	   context	   of	   global	   insecurities–	   to	   preserve	   and	   extend	   their	   clients’	   interests	  
(O’Reilly	  2010).	  This	  is	  both	  a	  calculated	  and	  a	  calculating	  business.	  It	  involves	  much	  
more	  than	  drumming	  up	  business	  by	  fostering	  client	  anxiety	  –to	  continuously	  do	  so	  
would	   prove	   self-­‐defeating	   by	   creating	   what	   one	   security	   consultant	   termed	  
‘warning	   fatigue’–	   but	   rather	   focuses	   upon	   creating	   sustainable	   markets	   for	   their	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services.	   Not	   only	   reducing	   risk	   exposure	   but	   identifying	   and	   facilitating	   profitable	  
business	   ventures	   in	   complex	   security	   environments	   that	   may	   initially	   appear	  
discouraging.	  Indeed,	  if	  we	  understand	  intelligence	  not	  only	  as	  information	  obtained	  
covertly	  but	  also	  as	  ‘risk	  assessment	  intended	  to	  guide	  action’	  (Chesterman	  2011:	  7),	  
then	  these	  firms	  are	  consummate	  intelligence	  entities.	  	  
The	   characterisation	   of	   TSCs	   as	   providers	   of	   private	   high	   policing	   can	   also	   be	  
attributed	  to	  their	  engagement	  in	  absorbent	  policing,	  albeit	  in	  a	  less	  pervasive	  form	  
than	   their	   state	  security	  counterparts.	  Whilst	   they	  cannot	  match	  either	   the	   latter’s	  
ambitions	  for	  ubiquity	  or	  capacity	  for	  data-­‐retention,	  they	  share	  a	  proclivity	  towards	  
amassing	  utile	  intelligence	  that	  is	  later	  expediently	  deployed.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  TSCs	  this	  
is	   when	   it	   is	   re-­‐packaged	   into	   security	   products	   and	  marketed	   to	   clients.	   Leading	  
firms	  also	  compile	  their	  own	  databases	  to	  track	  trends	  in	  pertinent	  security	  risks.	  For	  
example,	  Control	  Risks	  maintains	  a	  global	  database	  of	  kidnappings	  that	  extends	  back	  
to	  1975	  with	  the	  firm	  claiming	  to	  have	  resolved	  over	  2,000	  cases.3	  This	  propensity	  to	  
absorb	  useful	   knowledge	   is	   also	  evident	   in	   recruitment	   strategies,	  where	  expected	  
gravitation	   towards	   former	   state	   security	   operatives	   is	   enhanced	   by	   what	   one	  
security	  consultant	  described	  as	  ‘integrating	  thought-­‐leaders’	  from	  other	  fields	  that	  
contribute	  to	  the	  cumulative	  knowledge	  base.	  Such	  areas	  include:	  the	  energy	  sector:	  
the	  extractive	   industry;	   forensic	   accounting;	   humanitarianism;	  media;	   government;	  
and,	  academics	  with	  relevant	  language	  skills	  or	  geopolitical	  specialisations.	  
TSCs	  also	   represent	  model	  examples	  of	   ‘High	  policing	  organisations…attempting	   to	  
harness	  the	  power	  of	  informal	  networks’	  (Brodeur	  &	  Dupont	  2006:	  21).	  This	  is	  most	  
evident	   in	  challenging	  emerging	  markets	  where	  they	  will	  often	  recruit	   former	  state	  
security	   operatives	   from	   their	   host	   nation.	   Tapping	   into	   both	   the	   symbolic	   capital	  
and	  personal	  connections	  of	  these	  actors	  improves	  TSCs’	  capacity	  to	  assist	  clients	  in	  
contexts	  with	   elevated	   risks	   such	   as	   corruption	   and	   organised	   crime.	   Such	  human	  
resources	   are	   invaluable	   when	   guiding	   clients	   through	   precarious	   business	   terrain	  
where	   boundaries	   between	   informality	   and	   illegality	   are	   often	   indistinct	   and	   local	  
                                                
3	  Control	  Risks	  ⎜	  Kidnap	  and	  Crisis	  Response:	  
www.controlrisks.com/Services/Security/CrisisManagement/Pages/KidnapPreparednessandResponse
.aspx	  (Accessed:	  August	  20,	  2013).	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law	   enforcement	   is	   at	   best	   inefficient	   or	   under-­‐resourced,	   at	   worst	   corrupt	   and	  
dangerous.	  
Whilst	   TSCs	   are	   certainly	   keen	   to	   resolve	   clients’	   security	   problems,	   in	   true	   high	  
policing	  fashion	  their	  interest	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  crime	  suppression	  per	  se.	  Certainly,	  they	  
may	   provide	   strategic	   support	   to	   sympathetic	   law	   enforcement	   contacts	   to	  
investigate	  crimes	  suffered	  by	  their	  clients.	  However,	  the	  primary	  objective	  is	  not	  to	  
apprehend	  those	  responsible	  and	  bring	   them	  to	   justice	  but	   rather	   to	   restore	  client	  
interests	  and	  to	  avoid	  future	  exposure.	  TSCs	  may	  not	  directly	  manipulate	  criminality	  
in	   the	   same	  manner	   as	   public	   high	   policing	   actors	   but	   there	   is	   dependency	   on	   its	  
continued	   presence	   –and	   indeed	   that	   of	   other	   threats–	   to	   both	   legitimize	   and	  
necessitate	   their	   services.	   Indeed,	   even	   if	   they	   do	   not	   have	   truck	   with	   the	  
underworld	  and	  are	  unlikely	  to	  engage	  in	  extra-­‐legal	  action,	  TSCs	  have	  proved	  adept	  
at	  dancing	  creatively	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  those	  who	  do.	  
	  
Boutique	  Intelligence	  Firms	  
The	  activities	  of	  boutique	   intelligence	   firms	  blend	  highly	  developed	  analytical	   skills	  
with	  more	  dubious	  practices.	  Operating	  within	  a	  more	  niche	  market,	  their	  activities	  
not	   only	   include	   traditional	   high	   policing	   tactics	   of	   infiltration	   but	   also	   extend	   to	  
deceptive	  public	   relations	   strategies,	   online	   censorship	  and	  even	   the	   facilitation	  of	  
private	   justice.	   Whilst	   they	   rarely	   cross	   the	   Rubicon	   into	   extra-­‐legality	   –and	   can	  
always	  turn	  to	  freelance	  covert	  operatives	  should	  such	  needs	  arise–	  their	  actions	  are	  
emblematic	  of	  corporate	  authoritarianism	  in	  the	  transnational	  information	  age.	  
To	  demonstrate	  how	  these	  intelligence	  strategists	  sit	  comfortably	  within	  notions	  of	  
private	   high	   policing,	   British	   firm	   Hakluyt	   –currently	   trading	   as	   the	   Holdingham	  
Group–	  and	  US	  firm	  Total	  Intelligence	  Solutions	  –now	  re-­‐branded	  as	  OODA–	  provide	  
examples.	   Both	   firms	   were	   established	   by	   former	   state	   security	   operatives	   who	  
brought	   their	   intelligence	   tradecraft	   to	   the	   corporate	   sphere.	  Both	   firms	  have	  also	  
attracted	   controversy	   despite	   a	   shared	   proclivity	   towards	   a	   low-­‐profile	   corporate	  
existence.	   In	   the	   case	  of	  Hakluyt,	  one	  activist	   group	  uncovered	  how	   it	  had	  hired	  a	  
freelance	  spy	  to	  infiltrate	  European	  protest	  groups	  and	  obtain	  information	  on	  future	  
campaigns	   against	   leading	   oil	   companies	   (Lubbers	   2002;	   2012;	   see	   also	   further	  
discussion	   below).	   Total	   Intelligence	   Solutions	   has	   similarly	   been	   accused	   of	   using	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infiltration	   to	   obtain	   information	   on	   activists	   targeting	   agriculture	   conglomerate	  
Monsanto	  (Scahill	  2010).	  Whilst	  these	  allegations	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  substantiated	  –
characteristically,	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  services	  provided	  remains	  contested–	  it	  
should	  be	  noted	   that	  Monsanto	  has	   ‘form’	   in	  deploying	  private	   actors	   to	   suppress	  
critical	  voices	  (Lubbers	  2012:	  Ch.5).	  
Beyond	   such	   orthodox	   infiltration	   methods,	   boutique	   intelligence	   firms	   have	   also	  
deployed	   devious	   strategies	   drawn	   from	   shady	   sub-­‐fields	   of	   public	   relations	   and	  
information	   security.	   Indeed,	   the	   capacity	   to	   incorporate	   techniques	   gleaned	   from	  
other	   areas	   underlines	   private	   high	   policing’s	   inherent	   capacity	   for	   reinvention	   to	  
protect	   its	   corporate	   auspices.	   Weiss	   (2007)	   has	   previously	   articulated	   how	  
throughout	   modern	   history,	   private	   security	   has	   consistently	   adapted	   to	   conquer	  
‘new	   frontiers	   of	   capitalist	   expansion’	   (p.1).	   Extending	   his	   analysis	   to	   private	   high	  
policing,	  similar	  observations	  can	  be	  made	  regarding	  new	  loci	  of	  capitalist	  activity;	  a	  
chain-­‐reaction	  will	  often	  be	  triggered	  as	  organised	  opposition	  emerges	  and	  becomes	  
the	  target	  of	  questionable	  tactics	  to	  defend	  powerful	  interests.	  Indeed,	  Weiss	  (2007)	  
has	  astutely	  oberved	  how	  ‘…today’s	  “frontier”	  policing	  is	  a	  throwback	  to	  the	  laissez-­‐
faire	  capitalist	  era	  of	  labor	  spies’	  (p.3;	  see	  also:	  O’Reilly	  &	  Ellison	  2006:	  653).	  
In	   establishing	   the	   new	   research	   fields	   of	   ‘activist	   intelligence’	   and	   ‘covert	  
counterstrategy’,	  the	  ground-­‐breaking	  work	  of	  Lubbers	  (2012)	  charts	  a	  trajectory	  of	  
authoritarianism	  from	  the	  suppression	  of	  organised	  labour	  by	  industrial	  capitalism	  to	  
contemporary	   targetting	   of	   activists	   by	   transnational	   capitalism.	   Indeed,	   there	   is	  
continuity	  not	  only	   throughout	  history	  but	  also	  across	  public	   and	  private	  domains;	  
the	   (mis)representation	   of	   legitimate	   dissent	   as	   violent	   radicalism	   legitimises	  
recourse	  to	  covert	  methods	  in	  both	  spheres.	  Indeed,	  the	  amorphous	  designation	  of	  
‘subversive’	  has	  passed	  from	  leftist	  movements	  to	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  activism,	  often	  
those	   concerned	   with	   environmental	   issues	   and	   usually	   grouped	   under	   the	  
pejorative	  label	  of	  ‘anti-­‐globalisation’.	  As	  one	  activist-­‐journalist	  has	  remarked:	  ‘green	  
is	  the	  new	  red’	  (Potter	  2011).	  
In	   the	   current	   transnational	   information	   age,	   the	   location	   for	   both	  worker	   dissent	  
and	  activist	  opinion	  has,	  at	   least	  partially,	   relocated	  online.	  Commercial	  concern	  as	  
to	   the	   scope	   and	   impact	   of	   such	   criticism	   has	   witnessed	   the	   development	   of	  
advanced	   surveillance	   programmes	   to	   identify	   not	   just	   militant	   staff	   and	   activist	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critics	  but	  even	  those	  unhappy	  customers	  who	  take	  their	  complaints	  to	  the	  Internet.	  
The	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  of	  such	  cyber-­‐snooping	  have	  included	  firing	  militant	  
employees	   and	   ‘re-­‐educating’	   those	   deemed	   too	   sympathetic	   to	   labour	   grievances	  
(Stepanek	  2000).	  As	  Lubbers	  (2012)	  highlights	  not	  only	  does	  such	  virtual	  surveillance,	  
and	   the	   corporate	   authoritarianism	   it	   epitomises,	   pose	   dangerous	   implications	   for	  
freedom	  of	  association,	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  but	  it	  can	  also	  
facilitate	  extreme	  forms	  of	  private	  justice.	  One	  powerful	  example	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  
case	   of	   Northwest	   Airlines	   who	   fired	   militant	   workers	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   evidence	  
collected	  through	  an	  online	  surveillance	  system	  called	  ‘CyberSleuth’	  (Lubbers	  2002:	  
121;	  2012:	  118).	  
Further	   extending	   their	   dubious	   repertoire	   boutique	   intelligence	   firms	   have	   also	  
integrated	   ‘issue	   management’,	   a	   variant	   form	   of	   public	   relations,	   alongside	  
traditional	  intelligence	  work.	  This	  semi-­‐visible	  practice	  echoes	  tenets	  of	  high	  policing	  
as	   it:	   ‘…emphasizes	   the	  need	   for	   scanning,	  monitoring	  and	   tracking	  external	   forces	  
that	  are	  a	  potential	   threat	   to	   the	   company’	   (Lubbers	  2012:	  196).	   Its	   toxic	  blend	  of	  
diplomacy	  and	  intelligence	  is	  characterised	  by	  secrecy,	  deceit	  and	  manipulation.	  For	  
example,	  dialogue	  with	  activists	  is	  cynically	  initiated	  for	  intelligence	  gathering	  rather	  
than	   mediation	   (Rowell	   2002).	   One	   firm,	   Stratfor	   –short	   for	   Strategic	   Forecasting	  
Inc.–	   has	   developed	   a	   sophisticated	   ‘divide	   to	   rule’	   playbook	   for	   defeating	   activist	  
opposition	   (Horn	   2013)	   with	   tactics	   that	   are	   reminiscent	   of	   counter-­‐insurgency	  
strategy,	  albeit	  in	  the	  different	  setting	  of	  corporate	  capitalism.	  
	  
Private	  Detectives	  and	  Freelance	  Covert	  Operatives	  
The	  dubious	   exploits	   of	   private	  detectives	   and	   freelance	   covert	   operatives	  provide	  
perhaps	   the	  most	  potent	  demonstration	  of	  private	   forms	  of	  high	  policing.	   To	  both	  
protect	  and	  augment	  powerful	  corporate	   interests,	   their	  activities	  have	  centred	  on	  
two	  principal	  objectives:	   to	   suppress	  dissent,	  whether	   internal	  or	   external;	   and,	   to	  
ensure	  competitive	  advantage	  by	  engaging	  in	  corporate	  espionage.	  Indeed,	  the	  more	  
questionable	  the	  activity,	  the	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  outsourcing	  to	  these	  clandestine	  
agents.	  Establishing	  a	  critical	  distance	  from	  shady	  exploits	   is	  not	  only	   important	  for	  
corporate	   auspices	   but	   equally	   for	   other	   private	   high	   policing	   actors	   –notably	  
aforementioned	  boutique	  intelligence	  firms–	  who	  contract	  out	  assignments	  to	  these	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ultra	  low-­‐profile	  operators	  in	  similar	  pursuit	  of	  plausible	  deniability.	  This	  ‘dirty	  work’	  
(Marx	   1987)	   hypothesis	   can	   be	   further	   extended	   into	   the	   public	   domain	   as	   the	  
police,	   government	   departments	   and	   even	   executive	   interests	   have	   all	   deployed	  
private	  agents	  to	  pursue	  extra-­‐legal	  objectives	  and	  circumvent	  their	  own	  operational	  
limitations	  (Brodeur	  2010:	  292;	  Lubbers	  2012:	  xiii-­‐xiv).	  
The	   pivotal	   role	   of	   these	   private	   actors	   in	   the	   genealogical	   evolution	   of	   the	   high	  
policing	  paradigm	  has	  previously	  been	  acknowledged	  (Brodeur	  2007:	  31;	  O’Reilly	  &	  
Ellison	   2006:	   647)	   and	   is	   most	   explicit	   in	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   Pinkerton	   National	  
Detective	   Agency	   (Morn	   1982:	   68-­‐69).	   It	   provided	   the	   template	   for	   using	   covert	  
methods	   to	  undermine	  worker	  movements	   and	   to	  destroy	   radical	   political	   groups;	  
strategic	   practices	   subsequently	   embraced	   by	   a	   nascent	   FBI.	   As	   ‘an	   essential	  
ingredient	  in	  industrial	  capitalism’s	  struggle	  against	  working	  class	  militancy’	  (Spitzer	  
&	  Scull	  1977:	  22)	  and	  a	  key	  facet	  of	  ‘the	  government-­‐business	  alliance	  against	  labor’	  
(Goldstein	   1978:	   5),	   the	   Pinkerton	   Agency	   was	   an	   early	   example	   of	   private	   high	  
policing.	  Its	  activities	  emphasize	  that	  private	  actors	  are	  not	  new	  to	  this	  paradigm	  and	  
also	  counter	  dominant	  perceptions	  that	  dubious	  methods	  are	  cultivated	  in	  the	  public	  
sphere	   before	   transplantation	   into	   the	   private.	   The	   reality	   of	   public-­‐private	  
interactions	  has	  always	  been	  more	  complex	  (O’Reilly	  2010:	  194-­‐196).	  
An	   enduring	   predilection	   to	   both	   monitor	   worker	   activity	   (see,	   for	   example:	   Chu	  
2009)	  and	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  organised	  dissent	  ensures	  that	  recourse	  to	  private	  detectives,	  
as	  well	   as	   other	   forms	  of	   private	  high	  policing	   action	   such	   as	   ‘blacklisting’,	   remain	  
features	   of	   corporate	   authoritarianism;	   such	   activities	   often	   entailing	   nefarious	  
public-­‐private	   connections	   (Boffey	   2010).	   Indeed,	   one	   unexpected	   revelation	   from	  
the	  Leveson	  Inquiry	  into	  unethical	  practices	  by	  the	  British	  press	  was	  that	  the	  Serious	  
Organised	  Crime	  Agency	  possessed	  a	  list	  of	  some	  one	  hundred	  companies	  –including	  
leading	   law-­‐firms,	   insurance	  houses	  and	   finance	  companies–	  who	  had	  used	   ‘rogue’	  
private	   investigators	   to	   obtain	   information	   in	   contravention	   of	   data	   protection	  
legislation	  (Laville	  2013).	  
Delving	   deeper	   into	   the	   murky	   world	   of	   private	   high	   policing,	   freelance	   covert	  
operatives	   are	   its	   least	   visible	   manifestation.	   Their	   supremely	   clandestine	   work	   is	  
usually	  conducted	  by	   lone	  operators	  or	   small	   teams.	  Such	  activities	   rarely	  come	  to	  
public	   attention	   and	   when	   they	   do,	   it	   is	   normally	   as	   a	   result	   of	   either	   activist	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vigilance	  or	  revelations	  during	   legal	  proceedings	   involving	  their	  corporate	  auspices.	  
Triangulating	   a	   range	   of	   such	   sources,	   Lubbers	   (2012)	   has	   constructed	   detailed	  
accounts	   of	   several	   notable	   operations	   involving	   these	   spies-­‐for-­‐hire.	   The	   case	   of	  
Manfred	  Schlickenreider	  provides	  an	  instructive	  example.	  This	  faux	  activist	  posed	  as	  
a	   left-­‐wing	   sympathiser	   and	   documentary	   filmmaker	   to	   gain	   the	   confidence	   of	   a	  
number	   of	   European	   social	   movements.	   Compiling	   intelligence	   dossiers	   for	   both	  
corporate	   clientele	   –such	  as	   Shell	   and	  BP	   through	   the	   intermediary	  of	  Hakluyt–	   as	  
well	   as	   for	   the	   German	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   intelligence	   services,	   his	   operations	  
epitomise	  the	  blurred	  boundaries	  of	  high	  policing.	  
The	  trusted	  status	  that	  infiltrators	  achieve	  within	  activist	  groups	  can	  witness	  covert	  
operations	  extend	  beyond	  mere	  intelligence	  gathering	  towards	  multi-­‐layered	  deceit.	  
Acting	   as	   agents	   provocateurs,	   their	   influence	   can	   be	   leveraged	   to	   sow	   internal	  
division	  and	  to	  deliver	  highly	  calculated	  disruption.	  One	  insidious	  stratagem	  involves	  
steering	   the	   group	   towards	   direct	   action	   that	   damages	   either	   the	   reputation	   or	  
property	   of	   the	   corporate	   target	   (Lubbers	   2012:	   145).	   The	   auspice/victim	  
subsequently	  takes	  legal	  action	  for	  resultant	  losses	  even	  though	  these	  were,	  in	  fact,	  
instigated	   by	   its	   own	  machinations.	   Of	   course,	   obtaining	   such	   damages	   is	   not	   the	  
primary	  objective;	  that	  is	  the	  operational	  paralysis	  of	  these	  groups.	  
Although	   tasking	   covert	   agents	   with	   corporate	   espionage	   lacks	   the	   social	   control	  
dimensions	   of	   suppressing	   activism	   and	   dissent	   described	   above,	   the	   clandestine,	  
coercive	  and	  deceptive	  methods	  deployed	  to	  gain	  strategic	  advantage	  over	  business	  
competitors	  bear	  many	   recognised	  high	  policing	   traits.	  Whilst	   corporate	  espionage	  
has	   received	   limited	   academic	   attention,	   those	   studies	   that	   have	   been	   conducted	  
reveal	  an	  extensive	  range	  of	   techniques:	   theft	  of	   trade	  secrets;	  bribery;	  black-­‐mail;	  
‘dumpster-­‐diving’;	  high-­‐tech	  surveillance;	  targeting	  disgruntled	  employees;	  inserting	  
‘moles’	   to	   gather	   commercial	   intelligence;	   circulating	   disinformation	   about	   rival	  
products;	   and	   even,	   sabotaging	   competitor	   operations	   (Crane	   2005:	   236;	   Hulnick	  
2002:	  72;	  Nasheri	  2005:	  8).	  
The	   application	  of	   these	   clandestine	   activities	   on	  behalf	   of	   corporate	   interests	   has	  
largely	   escaped	   consideration	   through	   the	   conceptual	   prism	   of	   high	   policing.	  
However,	  closer	  research	  attention	  to	  corporate	  espionage	  has	  significant	  potential	  
to	  enhance	  existing	  analyses.	  There	  are	  nuances	  to	  this	  form	  of	  private	  high	  policing	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action	  that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  present	  in	  its	  more	  intensively	  examined	  public	  forms.	  
For	  example,	  the	  recruitment	  of	  informants	  takes	  on	  novel	  dynamics	  when	  relocated	  
to	   the	   corporate	   realm.	   The	   integration	   of	   motivations	   such	   as	   professional	  
advancement,	   employee	   dissatisfaction	   and	   the	   exploitation	   of	   cultural	   afinities	  
(Nasheri	  2005:	  80-­‐81;	  88)	  enhances	  the	  scope	  for	  recruiting	  human	  sources	  beyond	  
staple	  tactics	  of	  manipulating	  greed,	  exploiting	  personal	  indiscretions	  and	  harnessing	  
ideological	   empathy.	   In	   contrast	   to	   state	   security	   agencies,	   corporations	   also	   have	  
limited	  means	   –both	   operationally	   and	   legally–	   to	   conduct	   counter-­‐intelligence	   to	  
protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  enemy	  within;	  running	  double-­‐agents	  or	  forcing	  staff	  to	  
take	  polygraph	   tests	   is	   ‘forbidden	  by	   law	  or	   unworkable	   in	   practice	   (Hulnick	   2002:	  
68).	  
Consequently,	  not	  only	  is	  there	  operational	  space	  for	  human	  intelligence	  operations	  
in	   the	   corporate	   sphere	   but	   its	   extent	   may	   be	   an	   even	   darker,	   ‘dark	   figure’	   than	  
previously	  imagined.	  This	  is	  not	  solely	  attributable	  to	  the	  challenges	  of	  detection,	  as	  
even	  if	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  corporate	  espionage	  are	  identified,	  the	  decision	  to	  pursue	  
compensation	   may	   be	   tempered	   by	   commercial	   considerations	   (Gill	   &	   Hart	   1999:	  
252-­‐254;	   O’Reilly	   &	   Ellison	   2006:	   649).	   Embarrassing	   revelations	   of	   organisational	  
security	  failures	  may	  negatively	  impact	  on	  shareholder	  confidence,	  whilst	  contested	  
legal	  proceedings	  might	  release	  further	  sensitive	  information	  into	  the	  public	  domain.	  
Consequently,	   seeking	   reparation	   for	   the	   finanical	   loss	   suffered	   through	   corporate	  
espionage	  is	  often	  balanced	  against	  market	  factors.	  
	  
Convergence	  and	  Divergence	  at	  the	  Public-­‐Private	  Interface	  
Although	   the	   preceding	   analysis	   identifies	   common	   ground	   between	   private	   high	  
policing	   actors	   and	   their	   public	   counterparts,	   this	   permeable	   and	   uncertain	  
separation	   is	  characterised	  as	  much	  by	  asymmetry	  as	   it	   is	  by	  overlap.	  Similar	   traits	  
are	   present	   but	   to	   varying	   degrees,	   whilst	   contrasting	   operational	   capacities	   may	  
trigger	  functional	  fusion	  whereby	  ‘public	  and	  private	  police	  may	  be	  drawn	  together	  
to	   supplement	   their	   respective	   weaknesses’	   (Marx	   1987:	   183).	   In	   short	   there	   are	  
complex	   patterns	   of	   convergence	   and	   divergence	   to	   be	   interpreted.	   Previous	  
analyses	  provide	  some	  guidance	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  key	  similarities	  and	  areas	  of	  
public-­‐private	  coalescence	  (see,	  for	  example:	  O’Reilly	  &	  Ellison	  2006;	  O’Reilly	  2010).	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These	  include:	  an	  overarching	  ‘secrecy	  complex’	  (Brodeur	  &	  Dupeyron	  2003:	  12-­‐13)	  
that	   both	   protects	   secrets	   and	   covers-­‐up	   wrongdoing;	   a	   common	   ‘risk	   mentality’	  
(Johnston	  &	   Shearing	   2002:	   16-­‐17)	   that	   prioritises	   a	   culture	   of	   pre-­‐emptive	   threat	  
assessment;	   a	   mutually	   reinforcing	   insecurity	   discourse	   that	   promotes	   shared	  
‘mythologies’	  (Dupont	  2004:	  18)	  regarding	  arbitrarily	  prioritised	  threats;	  and,	  highly	  
developed	  complicity	  in	  the	  obfuscation	  of	  responsibility	  for	  extra-­‐legality	  and	  abuse	  
(Jamieson	  &	  McEvoy	  2005).	  The	   fact	   that	  most	  private	  high	  policing	  actors	  possess	  
backgrounds	   in	   state	   security	   service	   also	   feeds	   behavioural	   convergence	   and	  
informal	  interaction	  towards	  shared	  objectives.	  
In	  his	  final	  work,	  Brodeur	  (2010)	  returned	  to	  his	  defining	  features	  of	  high	  policing	  to	  
assess	  whether	   they	  were	   also	   evident	   in	   its	   private	  manifestations	   (pp.	   288-­‐293).	  
The	  principal	  thrust	  of	  his	  assessment	  was	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  are	  indeed	  present,	  
albeit	   to	  a	  quite	  varying	  degree.	  However,	  an	  element	  of	  Brodeur’s	  analysis	   that	   is	  
problematic	  was	  his	  assertion	  that:	  ‘…most	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  high	  policing	  do	  
not	   just	   apply	   to	   private	   high	   policing	   as	   such	   but	   also	   to	   private	   security	   when	  
considered	  as	   a	  whole’	   (Brodeur	  2010:	   288).	  As	   Stenning	   (2012:	   14)	  has	  observed,	  
this	  seems	  to	  inexplicably	  blur	  the	  distinction	  between	  high	  policing	  and	  low	  policing.	  
One	  explanation	  might	  be	   that	  Brodeur	  wished	   to	  draw	  parallels	  between	  policing	  
action	  that	  prioritises	  particular	  interests:	  those	  of	  the	  client(s)	  in	  relation	  to	  private	  
security;	   and,	   those	   of	   the	   executive	   in	   relation	   to	   (public)	   high	   policing.	  
Unfortunately,	   the	   intent	   that	   underpinned	   this	   connection	   remains	   unclear	   and	  
rests	   somewhat	   unsatisfactorily	   with	   existing	   high	   policing	   theory.	   Moreover,	   by	  
making	   this	  association	  between	  high	  policing	  and	  private	   security	  more	  generally,	  
Brodeur’s	  analysis	  became	  partially	  predicated	  upon	  that	  body	  of	  empirical	  research	  
concerning	   contract	   security	   providers,	   the	   salience	   of	   which	   is	   questionable.	   For	  
example,	  his	  identification	  of	  the	  high	  policing	  trait	  of	  absorbent	  policing	  progressed	  
beyond	   the	   strategic	   accumulation	   of	   intelligence	   by	   private	   actors	   to	   include	   the	  
manner	   in	   which	   private	   security	   deals	   with	  minor	   infractions	   such	   as	   shoplifting;	  
absorbing	  them	  through	  private	  justice	  solutions	  rather	  than	  reporting	  them	  to	  the	  
police	   or	   pursuing	   criminal	   justice	   sanctions.	   Such	   action	   does	   not	   smack	   of	   high	  
policing	  as	   it	   reflects	  a	  pragmatic	  solution	  to	  address	  a	  persistent	  criminal	  problem	  
rather	  than	  a	  mechanism	  for	  compiling	  intelligence.	  The	  reticence	  of	  private	  security	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actors	  to	  share	  such	  accumulated	  intelligence	  with	  their	  public	  counterparts	  (Lippert	  
&	  O’Connor	  2006:	  64)	  might	  bear	  superficial	  similarity	  to	  the	  high	  policing	  tendency	  
of	   creating	   information-­‐silos	  but	  ultimately	  also	   lacks	   the	  attendant	   future-­‐focused	  
dynamics	  of	  identifying	  potential	  threats	  to	  dominant	  power	  arrangements.	  
Notwithstanding	  this	  unnecessary	  extension	  into	  private	  security,	  Brodeur’s	  analysis	  
astutely	   mapped	   the	   imbalanced	   manifestations	   of	   high	   policing	   traits	   across	   the	  
public-­‐private	   divide.	   For	   example,	   he	   noted	   how	   the	   decreased	   scope	   for	   private	  
actors	   to	   engage	   in	   extra-­‐legality	   witnesses	   increased	   recourse	   to	   deceit.	   He	   also	  
identified	   the	   conflation	   of	   separate	   powers	   as	   the	   most	   significant	   area	   of	  
divergence:	   ‘…there	   is	   no	   equivalent	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   of	   the	   totalitarian	  
aggregation	   of	   all	   coercive	   powers	   and	   practices’	   (2010:	   292).	   Such	   circumstances	  
were	  only	  imaginable	  under	  extreme	  cases	  of	  economic	  colonization,	  Brodeur	  citing	  
the	   example	   of	   United	   Fruit	   in	   Latin	   America.	   However,	   there	   are	   other	   historical	  
instances	  where	   corporate	   authoritarianism	  has	   harnessed	   private	   high	   policing	   to	  
manifest	  excess	   in	  both	   its	  consolidation	  of	  power	  and	  its	  administration	  of	  private	  
justice.	  The	  Pinkerton	  Agency’s	  suppression	  of	  political	  radicals	  in	  the	  industrial	  age	  
provides	   a	   robust	   example.	   Not	   only	   did	   its	   strategies	   bear	   many	   hallmarks	   of	   a	  
counterinsurgency	   campaign	   but	   this	   firm	   was	   also	   party	   to	   an	   astonishing	  
usurpation	   of	   state	   authority.	   This	   was	   encapsulated	   by	   the	   hanging	   of	   nineteen	  
suspected	  members	  of	   the	   clandestine	  organisation,	   the	  Mollie	  Maguires,	   in	   1877,	  
which	  has	  been	  poignantly	  reflected	  upon	  as:	  
‘…one	  of	  the	  most	  astounding	  surrenders	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  American	  history.	  A	  
private	   corporation	   initiated	   the	   investigation	   through	   a	   private	   detective	  
agency;	  a	  private	  police	  force	  arrested	  the	  alleged	  offenders;	  the	  coal	  company	  
attorneys	   prosecuted	   them.	   The	   state	   only	   provided	   the	   courtroom	   and	   the	  
hangman’	  (Aurand	  1971:	  25,	  cited	  in	  Weiss	  1986:	  92)	  
Whilst	  such	  circumstances	  are	  rare	  in	  practice,	  they	  foreshadow	  the	  type	  of	  societal	  
settings	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   section,	  where	   private	   high	   policing	   ascendance	   can	  
occur	  and	  take	  on	  more	  extreme	  manifestations.	  
Brodeur’s	   analysis	   briefly	   notes	   public-­‐private	   parallels	   in	   relation	   to	   secrecy	   but	   I	  
would	  go	  further	  to	  suggest	  that	  divergence	  is	  also	  present	  where	  cultures	  of	  secrecy	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intersect	   with	   the	   varying	   visibility	   of	   high	   policing	   actors.	   Certainly,	   both	   sets	   of	  
providers	   maintain	   low	   profiles	   and	   zealously	   guard	   their	   operational	   secrecy.	  
However,	  in	  its	  more	  authoritarian	  forms,	  public	  high	  policing	  deliberately	  cultivates	  
a	  known	  presence	  to	  subtly	   intimidate	  its	  target	  population.	  State	  security	  agencies	  
achieve	  social	  control	  over	  their	  populace	  by	  being	   ‘felt	  everywhere,	  without	  being	  
seen’	  (Brodeur	  2010:	  230).	  Private	  high	  policing,	  in	  contrast,	  will	  seek	  to	  maintain	  its	  
hidden	   influence	   through	   achieving	   an	   unknown	   presence.	   This	   (in)visibility	   also	  
deflecting	  critical	  attention	  from	  their	  activities;	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  research	  what	  is	  rarely	  
seen,	   let	   alone	  detected.	   The	   coercive	   strategies	   of	   open	   secrecy	  might	   previously	  
have	   been	   evident	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   when	   there	   was	   mass	   deployment	   of	  
informants	   and	   agents	   provocateurs	   to	   undermine	   early	   American	   syndicalist	  
movements.	   However,	   contemporary	   private	   high	   policing	   forms	   lack	   such	   grand	  
social	   control	   ambitions	  and	  engage	   in	  much	  more	   subtle	  machinations	   to	  achieve	  
compliance.	  
Further	   consideration	   of	   the	   divergences	   between	   public	   and	   private	   high	   policing	  
reveals	  how	  their	  respective	  auspices	  inevitably	  shape	  their	  spheres	  of	  activity.	  This	  
is	  significantly	  more	  complex	  than	  any	  generalised	  assumption	  that	  the	  instrumental	  
linkage	   of	   public	   high	   policing	   providers	   to	   state	   authority	   facilitates	   a	   greater	  
operational	   range.	  Whilst	   it	   is	   broadly	   true	   that	   public	   trumps	   private	   in	   terms	   of	  
what	  it	  can	  do	  and	  where	  it	  can	  do	  it,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  reiterate	  that	  the	  authorising	  
clients	  of	  private	  high	  policing	  are	  not	  only	  corporations	  but	  may	  also	  include	  public	  
bodies	  and	  state	   institutions.	  When	  the	   latter	   is	   the	  case,	  these	  private	  actors	  may	  
enjoy	   both	   extended	   reach	   and	   indeed	   greater	   protection	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	  
connection	   to	   the	   state	   as	   well	   as	   their	   operational	   synergies	   with	   public	   actors.	  
Indeed,	  the	  ‘marginal	  structural	  position’	  (Marx,	  2014)	  of	  private	  actors	  may	  actually	  
witness	  enhanced	  operational	  freedom	  when	  compared	  to	  their	  public	  counterparts,	  
as	   they	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   ethical,	   legal,	   jurisdictional,	   organisational	   or	  
territorial	   constraints.	  This,	   comparatively	  privileged,	   status	  has	  proved	  particularly	  
significant	   at	   the	   transnational	   level	  with	   private	   actors	   being	   deployed	   to	   resolve	  
complex	   security	   scenarios	   where	   state	   intervention	   might	   be	   diplomatically	  
problematic	  (for	  example,	  when	  TSCs	  conduct	  kidnap	  and	  ransom	  negotiations,	  see:	  
O’Reilly	  2011).	  Moreover,	  a	  divergence	  of	  operational	  reach	  may	  actually	  catalyse	  a	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convergence	  of	  expertise	  to	  symbiotically	  overcome	  security	  challenges	  (Marx	  1987:	  
O’Reilly	  2010).	  
Additionally,	   to	  assess	   the	   remit	  of	  high	  policing	  providers	  purely	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  
auspice’s	  domain	  is	  to	  neglect	  their	  capacity	  –whether	  public	  or	  private–	  to	  conduct	  
operations	  at	  their	  own	  instigation	  rather	  than	  acting	  solely	  as	  their	  master’s	  agent.	  
Brodeur	  and	  Dupeyron	   (2003)	  have	  previously	  characterised	  public	  high	  policing	  as	  
occupying	  a	  space	   ‘[b]etween	   instrumentality	  and	   identity’	   (p.	  12).	  Not	  only	  may	   it	  
be	   difficult	   to	   ascertain	  whether	   operations	   stem	   from	  executive	   decision	   or	   state	  
security	   initiative	   but	   high	   policing	   providers	   have	   also	   proved	   quite	   capable	   of	  
deploying	   their	   skills	   to	   their	  own,	  personal,	  benefit	   through	   shady	  excursions	   into	  
the	  corporate	  sphere	  (Henriques	  &	  Bancaleiro	  2014).	  Similar	  independent	  dynamics	  
are	   evident	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   where	   covert	   operations	   are	   also	   pursued	   for	  
motivations	   that	   extend	   beyond	   paymasters’	   direct	   instructions.	   Manfred	  
Schlickenreider,	   the	   previously	   discussed	   freelance	   covert	   operative,	   conducted	  
intelligence-­‐gathering	   operations	   on	   his	   own	   initiative,	   confident	   that	   the	  
information	  collected	  would	  add	  value	  to	  dossiers	  he	  was	  already	  compiling	  (Lubbers	  
2012:	  153).	  Ideological	  motivations	  may	  also	  underpin	  private	  high	  policing,	  a	  reality	  
that	   has	   been	   evident	   in	   the	   surveillance	   of	   protest	   groups	   and	   left-­‐wing	  
sympathisers	   (see,	   for	   example:	   Lubbers	   2012:	   182-­‐191;	   O’Toole	   1978:	   31-­‐32).	  
Circumstances	  of	  political	  transition	  can	  also	  witness	  high	  policing	  actors	  attempt	  to	  
take	  greater	  control	  over	  their	  destiny.	  Motives	  of	  self-­‐preservation	  may	  be	  reflected	  
in	  surreptitious	  attempts	  to	  subjugate	  the	  change	  process,	  whilst	  mass	  migration	  to	  
the	   private	   sector	   may	   result	   in	   continued	   hidden	   influence	   under	   the	   emergent	  
political	  order	  and	  the	  repurposing	  of	  their	  coercive	  high	  policing	  toolkit	  for	  private	  
ambitions	   (see,	   for	   example:	   Łoś	   &	   Zybertowicz	   2000).	   The	   remaining	   section	  
wrestles	  with	  an	  outstanding	  question	  regarding	  private	  high	  policing	  handed	  down	  
by	  Brodeur	  (2007:	  34):	  what	  are	  its	  resources	  of	  symbolic	  power	  and	  how	  do	  these	  
impact	  upon	  its	  capacity	  for	  coercive	  action?	  
	  
Comparative	  Resources	  of	  Symbolic	  Power	  
In	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  symbolic	  power,	  Bourdieu	  (1991)	  articulated	  how	  it	  ‘…is	  
defined	   in	   and	   through	   a	   given	   relation	   between	   those	   who	   exercise	   power	   and	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those	  who	  submit	  to	  it’	  (p.	  170).	  Whilst	  this	  concept	  has	  gained	  analytical	  purchase	  
within	  the	  low	  policing	  realm	  (Loader	  1997;	  Mopas	  &	  Stenning	  2001),	  its	  application	  
to	  high	  policing	  has	  been	  more	  circumspect.	  Certainly,	  Brodeur	  (2007)	  identified	  it	  as	  
a	  key	  element	  of	  public-­‐private	  distinction	  and	  underscored	  its	  importance	  for	  future	  
research	  but	  this	  issue,	  like	  most	  previous	  discussion	  of	  private	  high	  policing,	  was	  left	  
hanging.	   This	   is	   largely	   attributable	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   symbolic	   power,	   this	   ‘almost	  
magical	   power,	   which	   enables	   one	   to	   obtain	   the	   equivalent	   of	   what	   is	   obtained	  
through	  force…by	  virtue	  of	  the	  specific	  effect	  of	  mobilization’	  (Bourdieu	  1991:	  170)	  
represents	   a	   challenging	   prospect	   for	   empirical	   investigation,	   even	  more	   so	   in	   the	  
high	   policing	   context.	   Consequently,	   the	   ambition	   of	   this	   section	   is	   to	   refine	  
Brodeur’s	  preliminary	  observations.	  
For	   Brodeur,	   the	   symbolic	   power	   of	   public	   high	   policing	   was	   bound-­‐up	   with	   the	  
cultural	  mythology	  surrounding	  secret	  service	  agents,	  as	  well	  as	  both	  the	  official	  and	  
tacit	  endorsement	  that	  their	  activities	  receive	  from	  the	  executive.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  
police,	   they	   derive	   symbolic	   power	   from	   ‘their	   low	   visibility,	   thriving	   on	   rumours,	  
innuendo	   and	   fear’,	   their	   depiction	   in	   popular	   culture	   fostering	   the	   belief	   ‘that	   an	  
intelligence	  agency	   is	   effective	   in	  proportion	   to	   its	  disrespect	  of	   all	   rules’	   (Brodeur	  
2007:	  34).	  It	  was	  further	  suggested	  that	  private	  high	  policing	  is	  comparatively	  weak	  
in	   terms	   of	   symbolic	   power	   and	   unable	   to	   advance	   any	   such	   legitimacy	   claims	   for	  
pursuit	  of	  more	  extreme	  coercive	  action.	  However,	  there	  is	  significantly	  more	  to	  be	  
said	  on	  the	  symbolic	  dimensions	  of	  private	  high	  policing.	  
In	  considering	  the	  wider	  spectrum	  of	  high	  policing	  action,	  rather	  than	  a	  narrow	  focus	  
upon	  coercive	  activity,	   it	  should	  first	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  both	  public	  and	  private	  
actors	  exert	  symbolic	  power	  through	  their	  capacity	  to	  designate	  security	  threats	  with	  
minimal	   second-­‐guessing	   of	   their	   analyses.	   Bigo	   (2000)	   further	   explained	   that	   for	  
these	  risk	  professionals,	  
‘The	  main	  source	  of	  their	  power	  is	  not	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  muster	  coercive	  force	  
(although	   they	   certainly	   do	   that),	   rather	   it	   is	   in	   their	   capacity	   to	   define	   the	  
sources	  of	  our	  insecurity.’	  (p.	  94)	  	  
High	   policing	   providers	   will	   generally	   occupy	   a	   privileged	   ‘position	   of	   enunciation’	  
(Bigo	   2006:	   125)	   and	  wield	   a	   ‘power	   of	   legitimate	   pronouncement’	   (Loader	   1997)	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regarding	  insecurities.	  Insofar	  as	  private	  actors	  are	  concerned,	  their	  risk	  assessments	  
shape	   client	   decisions	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   parallels	   the	   impact	   of	   intelligence	   agency	  
analyses	  on	  government	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  their	   increasingly	  pervasive	  presence,	  
both	  as	  agents	  of	  the	  national	  security	  apparatus	  and	  also	  as	  recurring	  contributors	  
to	  media	  coverage	  of	  security	   issues,	  has	  also	  been	  recognised	  as	   influential	  within	  
security	  discourse	   (O’Reilly	  2010).4	  Whilst	  public	  will	   still	  exceed	  private	   in	  both	   its	  
scope	   and	   degree	   of	   influence,	   there	   are	   undoubted	   similarities	   across	   these	  
manifestations	  of	  symbolic	  power.	  
Returning	   to	   the	   cultural	   mythology	   that	   surrounds	   high	   policing,	   popular	  
perceptions	   have	   certainly	   been	   shaped	   by	   spy	   fiction	   and	   a	   media	   focus	   that	   is	  
dominated	   by	   state	   security	   agents	   (see,	   for	   example:	  Wark	   1991).	   However,	   the	  
suggestion	  that	  their	  private	  counterparts	  lack	  any	  comparable	  potential	  to	  generate	  
symbolic	  power,	  whilst	   generally	   correct,	   requires	   some	  qualification.	   First,	   private	  
high	  policing	  actors	  are	  experts	  at	  invoking	  state	  security	  connections	  in	  order	  to	  tap	  
into	   the	   latter’s	   mystique.	   Whilst	   private	   low	   policing	   (contract	   security)	   may	  
attempt	   to	   channel	   the	   symbolic	   power	   of	   the	   public	   police	   by	   emulating	   their	  
appearance	   and	   behaviour,	   private	   high	   policing	   more	   subtly	   harnesses	   the	   dark	  
allure	  of	  its	  obverse	  by	  emphasizing	  staff	  backgrounds	  in	  state	  security	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
similarly	  secretive	  nature	  of	  their	  work.	  Second,	  private	  high	  policing	  actors	  have	  also	  
demonstrated	   significant	   skill	   in	   cultivating	   their	   own	   mythologies.	   The	   Pinkerton	  
Agency	   again	   provides	   a	   useful	   historical	   example	   through	   a	   range	   of	   image-­‐
management	   strategies	   that	   included:	   a	   panoptical	   emblem	   (the	   all-­‐seeing	   eye);	   a	  
motto	   that	   conveyed	   inexorability	   (‘we	   never	   sleep’);	   skilful	   media	   manipulation;	  
and,	  the	  publication	  of	  ghost	  written	  novels	  that	  eulogised	  the	  firm’s	  exploits	  (Morn	  
1982).5	   Such	   choreographed	   efforts	   portrayed	   this	   private	   detective	   firm	   as	   the	  
                                                
4 For	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   effort	   that	   some	   private	   high	   policing	   providers	  make	   to	   establish	   their	  
security	  credentials,	  to	  market	  their	  service-­‐lines,	  and,	  more	  tacitly,	  to	  contribute	  towards	  (in)security	  
discourse,	  see	  the	  ‘Commentary’	  webpage	  of	  leading	  intelligence	  consultancy,	  The	  Soufan	  Group.	  This	  
web	   resource	   gathers	   together	   this	   firm’s	  media	   contributions,	   policy	  briefings,	   press	   coverage	  and	  
public	  testimonies	  as	  well	  as	  a	  host	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  media	  and	  policy	  engagement.	  See:	  The	  Soufan	  
Group,	   Commentary:	   http://soufangroup.com/category/commentary/	   (Accessed:	   November	   27,	  
2014. 
5 Indeed,	  the	  air	  of	  mystery	  cultivated	  by	  the	  Pinkertons	  would	  even	  captivate	  audiences	  even	  beyond	  
the	  United	  States,	  as	  their	  renown	  travelled	  through	  their	  transatlantic	  operations	  and	   international	  
policing	  connections	  (Morn	  1982).	  Their	  self-­‐eulogizing	  efforts	  fostered	  such	  enduring	  public	  interest	  
that	  these	   ‘cowboy	  detectives’	  became	  part	  of	   the	  fabric	  of	  the	  cultural	  history	  of	   frontier	  America.	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nation’s	  premier	  crime-­‐fighting	  entity	  and	  were	  later	  replicated	  by	  the	  FBI	  when	  the	  
primary	   locus	   of	   high	   policing	   in	   the	   United	   States	   shifted	   from	   private	   to	   public.	  
Under	   the	   stewardship	   of	   J.	   Edgar	   Hoover,	   significant	   resources	   were	   devoted	   to	  
promoting	   the	   Bureau	   as	   an	   elite	   crime-­‐fighting	   force	  when	   in	   reality,	  most	   of	   its	  
operations	   –like	   those	   of	   its	   private	   predecessor–	   were	   focussed	   on	   repressing	  
organised	  dissent.	  
Today’s	   private	   high	   policing	   actors	   may	   not	   command	   such	   presence	   within	   the	  
public	   psyche	  but	   calculated	   strategies	   to	  manage	  mystique	  maintain;	   albeit	   these	  
are	   now	   principally	   deployed	   to	   convince	   potential	   clients	   to	   retain	   their	   services	  
rather	  than	  to	  legitimise	  dubious	  action	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  public.	  Jules	  Kroll,	  founder	  
of	   the	   eponymous	   corporate	   investigations	   specialist	   Kroll	   Inc.,	   successfully	  
harnessed	   media	   attention	   regarding	   high-­‐profile	   cases	   –for	   example,	   tracing	   the	  
misappropriated	  wealth	  of	  a	  number	  of	  dictators–	  to	  consolidate	  his	  firm’s	  image	  as	  
an	   ‘international	  gumshoe’,	  already	  having	  been	   tagged	   ‘Wall	   Street’s	  Private	  Eye’.	  
Whilst	   such	   cultivation	   of	   prestige	   may	   enhance	   a	   firm’s	   brand,	   it	   does	   little	   to	  
legitimise	   the	  more	   coercive	   action	  with	  which	   high	   policing	   has	   been	   associated.	  
Indeed,	   for	   those	   private	   actors	   who	   offer	   a	   darker	   high	   policing	   skills-­‐set,	   their	  
modus	  operandi	  is	  to	  evade	  detection	  and	  the	  likely	  criminal	  punishment	  that	  would	  
follow.	   Their	   actions	   will	   rarely	   receive	   societal	   or	   political	   acquiescence,	   unless	  
perhaps	  they	  happen	  to	  be	  acting	  under	  some	  form	  of	  state	  authority.	  	  
	  
Conclusion:	  The	  Unfinished	  Business	  of	  (Private)	  High	  Policing	  
The	  paradigm	  of	  high	  policing	  represents	  ‘unfinished	  business’	  on	  a	  number	  of	  levels.	  
First,	  the	  academic	  debate	  regarding	  its	  private	  dimensions	  is	  still	  developing	  and	  as	  
this	   analysis	   has	   established,	   there	   are	   a	   range	  of	   key	   aspects	   yet	   to	   receive	   close	  
examination.	   Second,	   this	   covert	  world	   is	   an	   inhospitable	  and	  obstructive	   research	  
terrain,	  one	  from	  which	  investigators	  often	  return	  laden	  with	  unresolved	  suspicions	  
and	  an	  overarching	  feeling	  that	  work	  is	  incomplete.	  Third,	  high	  policing	  is	  a	  research	  
subject	   that	   challenges	   us	   to	   reassess	   theoretical	   frameworks	   and	   to	   recalibrate	  
methodological	  tools	  in	  light	  of	  its	  variable	  methods	  and	  its	  shifting	  manifestations.	  
                                                                                                                                       
The	  Pinkertons	  are	  now	  even	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  eponymously	  titled	  cable	  TV	  drama.	  
	  	   29	  
Indeed,	   the	   challenging	   nature	   of	   this	   paradigm	   may	   be	   one	   reason	   why	   it	   has	  
stimulated	  as	  much	   theoretical	  debate	  as	   it	  has	  empirical	   investigation;	   a	   research	  
trend	  that	  this	  paper	  manifests	  and	  one	  which	  has	  previously	  drawn	  certain	  criticism	  
(Brodeur	  2007:	  31;	  Brodeur	  &	  Dupont	  2006:	  22-­‐23).	  However,	  theoretical	  refinement	  
does	   provide	   a	   valuable	   platform	   for	   future	   research	   ambitions,	   and	   important	  
guidance	  for	  future	  empirical	   investigation.	  Beyond	  spotlighting	  semi-­‐visible	  private	  
high	  policing	  actors	  and	  the	  disconcerting	  implications	  of	  their	  activities,	  theoretical	  
development	  also	  prompts	  a	  more	  profound	  reimagining	  of	   this	  policing	  paradigm.	  
Not	  only	  must	   important	  new	  dimensions	  be	   integrated	   into	   research	  agendas	  but	  
existing	  methodologies	  must	  also	  be	   refashioned	   to	  address	   the	  different	  nuances,	  
and	  indeed	  the	  new	  obstacles,	  that	  are	  presented	  by	  integrating	  the	  private.	  
A	   key	   objective	   of	   this	   discussion	   has	   been	   to	   highlight	   the	   pluralisation	   of	   high	  
policing,	   identifying	   key	   private	   actors	   as	   well	   as	   the	   complex	   patterns	   of	  
convergence	   and	   divergence	   that	   characterise	   the	   public-­‐private	   interface.	   Whilst	  
public	  high	  policing	  forms	  are	  sustained	  targets	  of	  critical	  attention	  and	  their	  actions	  
sporadically	   provoke	   sufficient	   outrage	   to	   set	   public	   inquiries	   into	   motion,	   their	  
private	   counterparts	   seem	  comparatively	  unscathed	  by	  societal	   scrutiny.	  One	  must	  
look	   back	   to	   the	   LaFollette	   Committee	   (1936-­‐41)	   and	   its	   investigation	   of	   private	  
detective	  agencies’	  anti-­‐syndicalist	  efforts	  in	  the	  USA	  to	  find	  an	  adequate	  precedent	  
for	  the	  type	  of	  wide-­‐ranging	  probe	  that	  is	  required	  to	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  dubious	  
actions	   of	   contemporary	   private	   agents.	   Indeed,	   the	   recent	   controversy	   in	   Britain	  
regarding	   the	   infiltration	  of	  activist	  movements	  demonstrates	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  
public	  has	  eclipsed	  private	  in	  terms	  of	  attention	  towards	  high	  policing	  action.	  Despite	  
evidence	  that	  both	  public	  and	  private	  agents	  were	  undermining	  these	  groups	   from	  
within,	  as	  well	  as	  clear	  overlaps	  in	  both	  their	  agendas	  and	  operations,	  the	  terms	  of	  
reference	  for	  existing	  investigations	  –most	  of	  which	  have	  been	  internal–	  have	  largely	  
excluded	   private	   dimensions	   to	   focus	   upon	   abusive	   actions	   by	   undercover	   police	  
officers.	  It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  this	  trend	  will	  change	  within	  the	  much-­‐anticipated	  public	  
inquiry	  called	  by	  the	  British	  Home	  Secretary.	  Indeed,	  it	  may	  very	  well	  be	  that	  private	  
high	   policing	   profits	   in	   the	   shadows	   when	   the	   critical	   spotlight	   falls	   on	   its	   public	  
sibling.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  very	  reason	  that	  those	  private	  high	  policing	  providers	  spotlighted	  
in	  this	  paper	  represent	  such	  important	  objects	  for	  future	  research.	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Undoubtedly,	   the	   diffuse	   and	   fragmented	   contemporary	  manifestations	   of	   private	  
high	  policing	  do	  not	  lend	  themselves	  to	  scrutiny	  and,	  as	  established	  in	  this	  analysis,	  
there	   are	   quite	   a	   variety	   of	   actors	   who	   fall	   under	   this	   conceptual	   umbrella.	  
Consequently,	   one	   of	   the	   challenges	   for	   academics	   in	   this	   field	   is	   to	   construct	   a	  
public	   debate	   that	   highlights	   the	   cumulative	   social	   harms	   caused	   by	   private	   high	  
policing.	  One	  vehicle	   to	  achieve	   this	  may	  be	   liberated	   sources	   such	  as	   the	  Stratfor	  
‘Global	   Intelligence	   Files’.	   These	   were	   published	   via	  WikiLeaks	   by	   the	   Anonymous	  
collective	   after	   they	   had	   hacked	   this	   intelligence	   firm.	   Such	   hactivism	   not	   only	  
exposes	  dubious	  activities	  and	  government	  connections	  but	  also	   furnishes	  datasets	  
that	  may	  prove	  useful	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  private	  high	  policing.	   It	   is	  somewhat	   ironic	  
that	   the	   surreptitious	   techniques	   used	   by	   techno-­‐anarchists	   to	   obtain	   information	  
such	   as	   this	   are	   a	   replication	   of	   high	   policing	   methods	   for	   anti-­‐establishment	  
objectives.	   However,	   such	   methodological	   innovation	   may	   prove	   increasingly	  
fundamental	  if	  we	  are	  to	  ever	  illuminate	  these	  fields	  of	  ‘endarkened	  governance	  (De	  
Lint	   2004).	   6	  Whilst	   the	   intertwining	   of	   activism	   and	   research	   agendas	   is	   still	   in	   its	  
infancy	  in	  this	  specific	  area	  –and	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  conducted	  within	  an	  explicit	  high	  
policing	  frame–	  it	  has	  already	  furnished	  instructive	  new	  strategies	  through	  which	  to	  
address	   this	  unwilling	  and	  dissembling	   field.	   (see,	   for	  example:	   Lubbers	  2012:	  200-­‐
206;	   Taylor	   2014).	   Integrating	   the	   theoretical	   refinements	   proposed	   in	   this	   paper	  
with	   such	   pioneering	   research	   methods	   is	   essential	   if	   we	   are	   to	   productively	  
excavate	  the	  exigent	  terrain	  of	  private	  high	  policing.	  
Whilst	   the	  public-­‐private	  distinction	   is	   certainly	  of	  heuristic	   value	   in	  understanding	  
this	  paradigm,	  it	  must	  be	  reiterated	  that	  the	  inherently	  liquid	  nature	  of	  high	  policing	  
ensures	  that	  it	  can	  also	  transcend	  neat	  categorisation.	  It	  floats	  across	  the	  public	  and	  
private	  spheres,	  simultaneously	  harnessing	  the	  potentialities	  of	  both	  and	  taking	  hold	  
wherever	   is	   most	   efficacious.	   It	   epitomises	   what	   Weiss	   has	   termed	   ‘a	   flex	   and	  
frequent	   permutation	   of	   spheres	   of	   power’	   (forthcoming).	   Indeed,	   in	   acting	   to	  
preserve	  and	  augment	  dominant	  power	  arrangements,	  high	  policing	  behaves	  like	  an	  
opportunistic	  infection	  to	  society’s	  compromised	  immune	  system.	  It	  is	  ever-­‐present,	  
                                                
6 In	  the	  context	  of	  discussing	  methodological	  innovations	  to	  research	  high	  policing,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  
the	  work	  of	   Luscombe	  and	  Walby	   (2014)	  which	  highlights	  how	   ‘access	   to	   information’	   requests	  can	  
provide	  a	  window	  –albeit	  it	  a	  limited	  one–	  on	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  security	  agencies.	  Of	  course,	  private	  
actors	  will	  often	  be	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  arrangements.	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difficult	   to	   eradicate	   and	   takes	   advantage	   of	   propitious	   conditions.	   In	   considering	  
how	  to	  advance	  research	  into	  its	  private	  dynamics,	  mapping	  the	  factors	  that	  create	  
conducive	  environments	  for	  their	  ascendance	  is	  key.	  Beyond	  in-­‐depth	  empirical	  work	  
into	   those	   private	   high	   policing	   providers	   that	   have	   been	   identified,	  we	  would	   do	  
well	   to	   chart	   their	   respective	   fortunes	   under	   such	   catalysts	   as,	   advances	   in	  
surveillance	   technologies,	   capitalist	   expansion,	   conflict,	   ruptures	   in	   security	  
governance	  and	  societal	  transition.	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